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ESICA: Securing—Not Compelling—
Speech on the “Vast Democratic
Forums” of the Internet
Philip Primeau*

“While we now may be coming to the realization that the
Cyber Age is a revolution of historic proportions, we cannot
appreciate yet its full dimensions and vast potential to alter
how we think, express ourselves, and define who we want to
be.”1
“REVOKE 230!”2
INTRODUCTION

America’s democratic political order requires “free trade in
ideas.”3 Today, this vital exchange is increasingly conducted
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law,
2021. I would like to thank Professor Andrew Spacone for his guidance and
insight.
1. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017).
2. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 29, 2020, 11:15
AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1266387743996870656; see
Bobby Allyn, As Trump Targets Twitter’s Legal Shield, Experts Have A
Warning, NPR (May 30, 2020 11:36 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/30/
865813960/as-trump-targets-twitters-legal-shield-experts-have-a-warning
[https://perma.cc/QL6R-KCX4].
3. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); see also Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479
U.S. 238, 264 (1986) (“Freedom of speech plays a fundamental role in a
democracy; as this Court has said, freedom of thought and speech ‘is the
matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.’”
(quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937))); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
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via online social media platforms. 4 However, some have alleged
that these platforms moderate political content in a biased
manner, jeopardizing the integrity of public discourse.5 In
June 2019, Senator Josh Hawley responded to such concerns by
introducing the Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act
(ESICA).6 ESICA would require providers of interactive
computer services of a certain size—including all major social
media platforms (e.g., YouTube, Facebook, Twitter)—to
demonstrate politically neutral content moderation policies in
order to enjoy the legal immunity currently afforded
U.S. 536, 552 (1965) (“[T]he opportunity for free political discussion is a basic
tenet of our constitutional democracy.”).
4. See, e.g., Diana Owen, The Past Decade and Future of Political Media:
The Ascendance of Social Media, BBVA, https://www.bbvaopenmind.com/
en/articles/the-past-decade-and-future-of-political-media-the-ascendance-ofsocial-media/ [perma.cc/8XVS-X7DK] (last visited Jan 13, 2021). On the effect
of social media on political discourse, one commentator observed:
Digital media have vastly increased the potential for political
information to reach even the most disinterested citizens. Attention
to the 2018 midterm elections was inordinately high, and the ability
for citizens to express themselves openly through social media has
contributed to this engagement. Issues and events that might be
outside the purview of mainstream journalists can be brought to
prominence by ordinary citizens.
Id. One survey found that “[twenty percent] of social media users say they’ve
modified their stance on a social or political issue because of material they saw
on social media, and [seventeen percent] say social media has helped to change
their views about a specific political candidate.” Monica Anderson, Social
media causes some users to rethink their views on an issue, PEW RESEARCH CTR.
(Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/07/socialmedia-causes-some-users-to-rethink-their-views-on-an-issue/
[perma.cc/K9EL-APPW].
5. See, e.g., Queenie Wong, Is Facebook censoring conservatives or is
moderating
just
too
hard?,
CNET
(Oct.
29,
2019),
https://www.cnet.com/features/is-facebook-censoring-conservatives-or-ismoderating-just-too-hard/ [perma.cc/GY3R-PRR6]; Sara Harrison, No One’s
Happy With YouTube’s Content Moderation Policies, WIRED (Aug. 28, 2019,
07:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/no-ones-happy-youtubes-contentmoderation/ [perma.cc/4MYD-M8G3]; Linda Givetash, Laura Loomer banned
from Twitter after criticizing Ilhan Omar, NBC NEWS (Nov. 22, 2018, 8:01 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/laura-loomer-banned-twitter-aftercriticizing-ilhan-omar-n939256 [perma.cc/8YCB-JEK5].
6. Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act, S. 1914, 116th Cong.
(2019),
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s1914/BILLS-116s1914is.pdf
[perma.cc/JB3V-QMYZ]. All signs suggest that Hawley will resubmit the bill
to the 117th Congress.
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automatically by Section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act (Section 230).7 Since its proposal, critics have suggested
that the bill is unconstitutional because, among other reasons,
it compels speech in violation of the First Amendment. 8
This Comment argues that ESICA is an important attempt to
secure democratic free speech culture on the internet and that it
would not unconstitutionally compel speech from the major social
media platforms. 9 Part I will look at the relationship between
democracy, free speech, and social media, as well as the promise of
America’s digital democracy and the threat posed thereto by
politically biased content moderation on the major social media
platforms. Part II will examine how ESICA would mitigate this
threat by altering the immunity regime established by Section 230.
Part III will contend that ESICA does not impermissibly compel the
major social media platforms to speak in violation of the First
Amendment.

7. Id. § 2; see Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230.
8. See, e.g., Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., How Conservatives’ Campaign To
Impose Political Neutrality Regulation On Big Tech Will Backfire, FORBES
(Dec. 23, 2019, 1:32 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/waynecrews/
2019/12/23/how-conservatives-effort-to-impose-political-neutrality-regulationon-big-tech-will-backfire/ [perma.cc/UUD5-KJLG]. Critics have attacked
ESICA on other constitutional grounds (such as vagueness), but this Comment
limits itself to considering the compelled speech critique. See, e.g., Eric
Goldman, Comments on Sen. Hawley’s “[Ending] Support for Internet
Censorship Act,” TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (July 10, 2019),
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2019/07/comments-on-sen-hawleysending-support-for-internet-censorship-act.htm
[perma.cc/7UEN-MQP8]
(putting forth a number of critiques of ESICA and collecting other sources).
9. This Comment focuses on what it calls “major social media platforms,”
particularly Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, which have been at the forefront
of the content moderation controversy. See sources cited supra note 5. Its
constitutional analysis is tailored with an eye toward those platforms.
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THE PROMISE OF THE “VAST DEMOCRATIC FORUMS” OF THE
INTERNET

A. Democracy and Free Speech
Democracy is often envisioned as the semi-regular ritual of
ballot-casting.10 Certainly, the selection of officials to make,
execute, and enforce laws on behalf of the people is a solemn
privilege of democratic citizenship.11 Yet, any account of democracy
that limits itself to this electoral liturgy is woefully incomplete.
Democracy is not an event or set of procedures, but an open-ended
practice of reasoning together about social and political matters. It
is a mode of common life characterized by an accessible,
transparent, and broad-based participatory discourse.12 American
democracy involves a wide range of public actions—debates,
parades, petitions, pickets, prayers, marches, incidents of civil
disobedience, and conscientious objection—whereby citizens air
their grievances, advance their interests, demand accountability,
chasten government officials, resolve community tensions, engage
in self-expression, and propose competing visions of the just society.
Democracy neither begins nor ends with the ballot box and it
cannot be reduced to the periodic election of governments. The very
“value and efficacy” of voting hinges on the “equal freedom . . . of
examining and discussing [candidates’] merits and demerits.” 13 In

10. See, e.g., Ian Prasad Philbrick & David Leonhardt, How to Participate
in Politics, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/guides/year-of-livingbetter/how-to-participate-in-government [perma.cc/2RZA-EFE3] (last visited
Jan. 13, 2021) (“Voting is the most fundamental form of civic engagement in a
democracy.”). This “proceduralist” view of democracy is quite common. See
Siddhartha Baviskar & Mary Fran T. Malone, What Democracy Means to
Citizens—and Why It Matters, 76 EUR. REV. OF LATIN AM. AND CARIBBEAN
STUDIES 3, 4 (2004).
11. See Martin Luther King, Jr., “Give Us the Ballot,” Address Delivered
at the Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom (May 17, 1957), in 4 THE PAPERS OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SYMBOL OF THE MOVEMENT, Jan. 1957–Dec. 1958,
208, 210 (Clayborne Carson et al., eds., 2000) (describing voting as a “sacred
right,” and its denial as a “betrayal of the highest mandates of our democratic
tradition”).
12. Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Addressing Internet Dangerous Expressions:
Deliberative Democracy and CleaNet©, 21 J. INTERNET L. 3, 5 (2018).
13. James Madison’s Report to the Virginia House of Delegates, 1800, FIRST
AMENDMENT WATCH (Jan. 25, 2018), https://firstamendmentwatch.org/history-
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other words, elections presuppose more primordial democratic
goods, the first of which is free speech, “the matrix, the
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.”14
As Benjamin Franklin said, “[f]reedom of speech is a principal
pillar of a free government; when this support is taken away, the
constitution of a free society is dissolved, and tyranny is erected on
its ruins.”15 The ancient progenitors of western self-government in
classical Athens saw free speech as “virtually equivalent to
democracy itself,”16 going so far as to say that democracy is “based
on speech (politeia en logois).”17 Our democracy likewise cherishes
bold public speech so that, through the forceful expression of
diverse viewpoints, foolish recommendations might be discredited
by juxtaposition with sage counsel, ignorance and hostility might
give way to understanding and sympathy, and common rule might
bring about the common good.18

speaks-james-madisons-report-virginia-house-delegates-1800/#selfgovernance
[perma.cc/44RV-UG8Y].
14. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937), overruled by Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
15. Phelps-Roper v. Ricketts, 867 F.3d 883, 891 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Benjamin Franklin, On Freedom of Speech and the Press, PA. GAZETTE (Nov.
1737), reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 285 (emphasis
added)).
16. Keith Werhan, The Classical Athenian Ancestry of American Freedom
of Speech, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 293, 298 (2008) (quoting Kurt A. Raaflaub,
Aristocracy and Freedom of Speech in the Greco-Roman World, in FREE SPEECH
IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY 41, 58 (Ineke Sluiter & Ralph M. Rosen eds., 2004)).
17. Id. (quoting Emily Greenwood, Making Words Count: Freedom of
Speech and Narrative in Thucydides, in FREE SPEECH IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY,
supra note 16, at 175–76).
18. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971). In Cohen, the Court
highlighted the importance of free expression:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a
society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended
to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public
discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced
largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such
freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more
perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport
with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our
political system rests.
Id. (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–77 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)).
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Indeed, free speech animates the very enterprise of selfgovernment, for it is “indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth.”19 The relevant “truth” here is political truth, i.e.,
approximate
conclusions
concerning
the
advantageous
arrangement of common life. Such conclusions are arrived at
through debate, compromise, and experimentation, rather than
necessary deduction from first principles, since political discourse
deals with variable and contingent realities.20 This process
necessarily puts a premium on the widespread diffusion of
information and opinion.21 It also recommends an empirical and
pragmatic mode of politics, which consists of testing ideas and
leaders while assimilating data, in quasi-organic fashion, from the
body politic’s multitudinous appendages. “[R]ight conclusions are
more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than
through any kind of authoritative selection.”22 The experimental
dynamism that distinguishes democracy—especially America’s
pluralistic liberal democracy—requires a thriving free speech
culture, or else its investigative and innovative inclinations will
atrophy.
Moreover, free speech has a role in forming democratic citizens,
who are not so much born as made—their political identities forged
through participation in civic conversation. By speaking aloud in
the public square, an individual performs, and thereby internalizes,
his or her sovereign identity.23 This internalization has profound
19. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
20. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (c. 340 B.C.E.), reprinted in THE
BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 935, 1025–27 (Richard McKeon ed., 2001).
21. See Martin H. Redish, Self-Realization, Democracy, and Freedom of
Expression: A Reply to Professor Baker, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 678, 682 (1982).
22. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1943), aff’d, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). But see JACQUES MARITAIN, THE RANGE OF
REASON 166 (1953). Maritain critiqued the supposed truism of free speech
arriving at truth:
One of the errors of individualist optimism was to believe in a free
society “truth,” as to the foundations of civil life, as well as the
decisions and modes of behavior befitting human dignity and freedom,
would automatically emerge from the conflicts of individual forces and
opinions supposedly immune from any irrational trends and
disintegrating pressures.
Id.
23. See id. at 167–68.
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social ramifications. The citizen’s realization of his or her freedom
and power tends to produce the sort of vibrant pluralism often
associated with democracy.24 Public speech must be unhindered in
a democracy, lest the reality of self-rule, being not fully articulated,
be not fully realized.25 Where the exuberant practice of free speech
is lacking, democratic self-identity inevitably withers away as
citizens forget that they are active participants in a project of selfgovernment, adopting instead the undemocratic roles of subject,
consumer, and spectator.26 At that point, the great dream of
democratic life—the formation of a body politic endowed with the
“collective capacity to effect change in the public realm . . . [and]
reconstitute the public realm through action”27—evaporates.
Additionally, insofar as the human being is a political creature who

24. See PLATO, REPUBLIC 296 (Robin Waterfield trans., Oxford Univ. Press,
1994) (375 B.C.E.). In Republic, Socrates offers a compelling account of
democracy’s “beauty” that is rather alluring to the modern American pluralist:
[I]n the first place, the members of the community are
autonomous, aren’t they?
The community is informed by
independence and freedom of speech, and everyone has the right to do
as he chooses, doesn’t he?
....
And given this right, then clearly every individual can make for
himself the kind of life which suits him.
....
I should think, then, that there’d be a wider variety of types of
people in this society than in any other.
....
It’s probably the most gorgeous political system there is . . . . Its
beauty comes from the fact that it is adorned with every species of
human trait, as a cloak might be adorned with every species of flower.
Id. Of course, Socrates’ reflection on democracy is hardly characterized by
unalloyed praise (quite the contrary), and even the above words contain more
than a trace of irony. For a thoughtful study of Plato’s complicated view of
democracy, see generally Arlene W. Saxonhouse, Democracy, Equality, and
Eide: A Radical View from Book 8 of Plato’s Republic, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 273
(1998).
25. See PLATO, supra note 24, at 299–300.
26. See id. at 300–02.
27. Josiah Ober, The original meaning of “democracy”: Capacity to do
things, not majority rule 5 (Princeton/Standford Working Papers in Classics,
Paper
No.
090704,
2007),
https://www.princeton.edu/~pswpc/pdfs/
ober/090704.pdf [perma.cc/Y6A5-2TLC].
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finds dignity and meaning within political community,28 the failure
of democratic citizenship ultimately hinders the realization of the
person’s deepest aspirations. 29
Thus, for members of a democratic regime, free speech is
essential to self-rule and self-fulfillment.30
B. Isēgoria and Parrhēsia: Illuminating Internet Free Speech
The Greeks characterized free speech in terms of isēgoria and
parrhēsia.31 Despite their ancient vintage, these concepts have
informed American speech-related jurisprudence and are helpful in
comprehending our free speech tradition.32 Significantly, isēgoria
and parrhēsia illumine the significance of digital fora in the
continuing maturation of American democracy.
For the purposes of this Comment, isēgoria indicates the
democratic citizen’s “equal opportunity” to address public matters

28. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, 1253a (Richard McKeon ed., 2011) (350 B.C.E.).
Aristotle described the political nature of man:
[I]t is evident that . . . man is by nature a political animal. . . .
....
. . . [T]he individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore
he is like a part in relation to the whole. . . . [And] man, when
perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and
justice, he is the worst of all . . . . But justice is the bond of men in
states, and the administration of justice . . . is the principle of order in
political society.
Id.
29. See THOMAS AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS 19
(Richard J. Regan, trans., Hackett Publ’g Co., Inc., 2007) (c. 1268–72).
[P]olitical order brings human beings back to justice. And the fact
that the Greeks call the order of the political community and the
standard of justice by the same term, namely, right order, makes this
clear. And so it is obvious that the one who established the political
community kept human beings from being the worst and brought
them to the condition of being the best in justice and virtues.
Id.
30. See Pnina Lahav, Holmes and Brandeis: Libertarian and Republican
Justifications for Free Speech, 4 J.L. & POL. 451, 459 (1988). This article is
highly recommended because it indicates that the “republican” case for free
speech was known and utilized by Justice Brandeis. See id. at 460–61.
31. Werhan, supra note 16, at 300.
32. See id. at 307–10 (tracing the influence of classical Athenian political
practice and theory on American free speech jurisprudence).
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before his or her fellows, while parrhēsia indicates the democratic
citizen’s rhetorical preference for “open[ ] and frank[ ]” speech.33
Isēgoria reveals the egalitarian presuppositions of democratic free
speech culture: the integrity of a democracy depends on the ability
of every citizen to access and enter into the civic discourse.34
Isēgoria also suggests the relationship between popular sovereignty
and free speech, for it is precisely free speech that enables the
people to “chart their collective course as a community.”35 For its
part, parrhēsia bespeaks the “confrontative, critical” quality of free
speech, even its tendency to be “crude, profane, or offensive.”36
Americans value free speech precisely as a tool for challenging
authority, disturbing convention, and expressing heterodox
opinion.37 Parrhēsia has been called the “sound of freedom.”38 This
sound is not always pleasant; sometimes it is quite harsh.39 But
such is the “music of democracy”40: Forthright, fearless,
disputatious,
unsparing,
unvarnished.41
Indeed,
“verbal

33. Id. at 300.
34. See id. at 301.
35. Id. at 309.
36. Id. at 316.
37. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941) (“[I]t is a prized
American privilege to speak one’s mind, although not always with perfect good
taste.”).
38. Werhan, supra note 16, at 318.
39. See Jonathan Simon, Parrhēsiastic Accountability: Investigatory
Commissions and Executive Power in an Age of Terror, 114 YALE L.J. 1419,
1421–22 (2005). The confrontational nature of parrhēsia distinguishes it from
gentler methods of persuasion. See id. Parrhēsia is akin to bitter medicine: it
cures—but not without causing discomfort. See id. Parrhēsia typically
involves courageous resistance to unjust authority. See id.
40. Judge Stephen H. Anderson, Law Day Address, 13 UTAH B.J. (2d ser.)
19, 20 (Sept. 2000) (speaking of “lawful protests, marches, meetings, speeches,
demonstrations, and so on”); see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24–25
(“To many, the immediate consequences of this freedom may often appear to
be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance. These are,
however, within established limits, in truth necessary side effects of the
broader enduring values which the process of open debate permits us to
achieve.”).
41. See Mary Anne Franks, Fearless Speech, 17 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 294,
320–23, 331 (2019); Werhan, supra note 16, at 323, 325–26, 328–29. Some
distinguish “fearless speech” (i.e., parrhēsia) from “reckless speech” (speech
that gratuitously offends, aggrieves, and incites). See Franks, supra, at 331.
Those who make this distinction reckon the hallmarks of parrhēsia to be
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cacophony” may be a fine measure of a democracy’s health. 42
In summary, isēgoria refers to the democratic citizen’s right to
access and shape civic discourse, while parrhēsia refers to the
democratic citizen’s candid and confrontational manner of speaking
in public.
C. Democracy, Free Speech, and the Internet
The progress of democracy can often be measured by the
expanding circle of those entitled to speak.43 However, speaking
serves no purpose—at least, no democratic purpose—if one’s voice
is too feeble to be heard by other citizens. In a small and egalitarian
democracy, the right to speak is effectively the right to be heard.44
But in a vast and unequal democracy, mere freedom of speech
means little for purposes of self-government.45 In such a regime,
the power of speech turns on access to means of communication. 46
Therefore, an evaluation of democratic integrity always involves an
analysis of the means of popular communication, with special

sincerity, criticism of power, and moral courage. See id. at 320–23. It is not
clear how helpful this distinction is in practice. First of all, irony (perhaps the
opposite of sincerity) holds an important place in the free speech tradition
(witness the figure of Socrates in much of the Platonic corpus). See Werhan,
supra note 16, at 323, 325–26. Furthermore, the question of who holds power
in society is often the very topic of parrhēsiastic discourse. See id. at 326.
Third, the American free speech tradition ennobles “provocative speech.” See
id. at 328–29; see also Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (“[A]
function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It
may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to
anger.”).
42. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
43. See Alina Rocha Menocal, What is a political voice, why does it matter,
and
how
can
it
bring
about
change?,
ODI (May
2014),
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinionfiles/8950.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HG4-Z8KV].
44. Cf. Case Note, Constitutional Law—Freedom of Speech as Including
the Right to be Heard Through The Use of Amplifying Devices, 3 U. MIAMI L.Q.
51, 51−52 (1948) (noting that courts have expanded the right of free speech
explicitly to include the right to be heard).
45. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION
TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
46. See Jennifer J. Lee, The Internet and First Amendment Values: Reno
v. ACLU and the Democratization of Speech in the Marketplace of Ideas, 22
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 61, 61–62, 82 (1997).
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attention paid to the “conditions of communication . . . on the
interplay of deliberative processes and informed public opinions.”47
Today, the “conditions of communication” are defined by the
digital revolution of the past few decades. It is undeniable that the
internet is—and will be—critical to the maturation of America’s
democratic enterprise, for it magnifies the presence of the ordinary
citizen in the political process by providing a cheap, convenient, and
unintimidating platform for observing and participating in public
discourse.48 Democratic legitimacy is fundamentally about the
“authorship” of our common life,49 and the internet provides an
unparalleled ability for citizens to contribute to the form, tone, and
direction of that shared project. On the internet, “[t]hrough the use
of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier
with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any
soapbox.”50 Although this language reflects archaic technology, it
captures the isēgoriastic promise of the “vast democratic forums of
the Internet,”51 where every American has the opportunity to relay
his or her opinion to countless fellow citizens. Additionally, the real
and metaphorical distance afforded by the internet encourages
parrhēsia. Citizens will post comments to politicians’ social media
accounts that they would likely never utter aloud and in person.
Intimidating power relations are arguably attenuated online,
allowing people to confront political, social, and economic leaders in

47. Cohen-Almagor, supra note 12, at 5 (citing JURGEN HABERMAS,
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 298 (1996)).
48. See id. Of course, a coin has two sides:
As the Internet provides cheap, virtually untraceable, instantaneous,
anonymous, uncensored distribution that can be easily downloaded
and posted in multiple places, it became an asset for terrorist
organizations, criminals, hate groups, and other antisocial individuals
who abuse the Internet to transmit propaganda and provide
information about their aims, to allow an exchange between likeminded individuals, to vindicate the use of violence, to delegitimize
and to demoralize their enemies, to raise cash, to enlist public support
and to promote violent conduct.
Id.
49. See Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L.
REV. 477, 482 (2011).
50. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
51. Id. at 868.
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a manner that is critical and contemptuous.52 Moreover, there are
certain sincerely held beliefs that individuals feel comfortable
publicizing only in the virtual realm. This digital fearlessness—
albeit occasionally misguided and intemperate—is facilitated by
the mask of anonymity, which is a venerable part of the American
free speech tradition.53 Finally, the ease of accessing online
discourse mitigates structural obstacles inherent to traditional
modes of discussion that have long disadvantaged minority
communities (for instance, the physically disabled).54
Social media platforms are the frontier of democratic free
speech culture: sprawling cyber-commons where millions of
Americans argue, organize, and collaborate, while subjecting
members of the social, political, and economic elite to scrutiny and
censure. The process is not tidy. All the prejudices and passions of
the “real world” exist online. Nevertheless, the major social media
platforms—Twitter,
YouTube,
and
Facebook—provide
extraordinary opportunities for isēgoriastic and parrhēsiastic
expression by providing every citizen a soapbox in an atmosphere
that encourages bold, disruptive, and creative speech. One
commentator noted: “[e]quipped with social media, the citizen no
longer has to be a passive consumer of political party propaganda,
government spin or mass media news, but is instead actually
enabled to challenge discources [sic], share alternative perspectives

52. See Angelo Antoci, Alexia Delfino, Fabio Paglieri, Fabrizio Panebianco
& Fabio Sabatini, Civility vs. Incivility in Online Social Interactions: An
Evolutionary Approach, PLOS ONE (Nov. 1, 2016), https://journals.plos.org/
plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0164286
[https://perma.cc/CP7NARR2].
53. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995)
(citation omitted):
Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a
pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy
and of dissent. Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority.
It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the
First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from
retaliation—and their ideas from suppression—at the hand of an
intolerant society.
Id.
54. See Jack M. Balkin, Commentary, Digital Speech and Democratic
Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004).
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and publish their own opinions.”55
In short, social media platforms, by their very structure, tend
to foster the open-ended, confrontational, and improvisational
conversations that animate authentic democracies. Despite the
undeniable prevalence of hate speech, misinformation, and sheer
nonsense, the proverbial uploading of public deliberation to social
media has created a richer, more inclusive, and more egalitarian
discourse.56 Across the major social media platforms, Americans
daily enact democracy by trading and testing ideas,57 diffusing
information,58 provoking controversy,59 critiquing power,60 and
expressing beliefs and preferences.61
D. Social Media Speech Suppression: Lurking Peril to Democracy
The Supreme Court has declared that a lively free speech
culture requires “that all persons have access to places where they
can speak and listen,” and the Court has further identified social
media as the “most important place[ ]” where this discursive
exercise transpires.62 Therefore, given the connection between free
speech and democracy, suppression of political speech on the major
social media platforms represents a threat to democracy itself. The
threat to democracy will only grow more acute as human
interaction is further digitized over the coming decades.

55. Brian D. Loader & Dan Mercea, Networking Democracy? Social media
innovations in participatory politics, 14 INFO., COMM. AND SOC’Y 757, 759
(2011).
56. See Ari Armstrong, The Egalitarian Assault on Free Speech, OBJECTIVE
STANDARD (Oct. 18, 2012), https://theobjectivestandard.com/2012/10/theegalitarian-assault-on-free-speech/ [perma.cc/FC4L-PN78].
57. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
58. See First Nat’l. Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978).
59. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
60. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964).
61. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
62. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
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The existence of politically-biased content moderation remains
hotly disputed.63 This Comment does not attempt to definitively
answer the question of whether the major social media platforms
are intentionally engaged in campaigns of selective speech
suppression. However, this Comment does maintain that, given the
increasing transfer of civic life to online fora, our democratic society
would be wise to proactively discourage censorship and encourage
a culture of robust free speech.
One cannot deny that the major social media companies have
the technological means to easily suppress speech with which they
disagree. With the click of a button, YouTube can demonetize a
channel, Facebook can suspend an account, and Twitter can limit
the visibility of content to other users on the platform.64 The recent
presidential election featured at least one remarkable (and
63. See, e.g., Mathew Ingram, The Myth of Social Media Anti-Conservative
Bias Refuses to Die, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Aug. 8, 2019),
https://www.cjr.org/the_media_today/platform-bias.php
[perma.cc/9EHZ2NAE] (denying systematic anti-conservative bias). But see, e.g., Kate Conger
& Sheera Frenkel, Dozens at Facebook Unite to Challenge Its ‘Intolerant ‘
Liberal
Culture,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
28,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/28/technology/inside-facebook-employeespolitical-bias.html [perma.cc/ENG6-W27E] (showing internal resistance to an
alleged liberal “political monoculture” in Facebook, although not speaking
directly to systematic bias by algorithm or human moderation); Kurt Wagner,
Twitter is So Liberal That Its Conservative Employees ‘Don’t Feel Safe to
Express Their Opinions,’ says CEO Jack Dorsey, VOX (last updated Sept. 14,
2018),
https://www.vox.com/2018/9/14/17857622/twitter-liberal-employeesconservative-trump-politics
[https://perma.cc/9YJN-WRAC]
(indicating
alleged political bias at Twitter). For a more evenhanded analysis of variation
within tech industry political cultures, see Sean Captain, Politics Are Tearing
Tech Companies Apart, Says New Study, FAST COMPANY (Feb. 28, 2019),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90313045/politics-are-tearing-tech-companiesapart-says-new-survey [perma.cc/BT74-SZSL].
64. See, e.g., The YouTube Team, Our Ongoing Work to Tackle Hate,
YOUTUBE OFFICIAL BLOG (June 5, 2019), https://blog.youtube/news-andevents/our-ongoing-work-to-tackle-hate [perma.cc/65CE-GU6B] (explaining
demonetization as an enforcement mechanism for violations of YouTube’s hate
speech
policies);
Disabled
Accounts,
FACEBOOK HELP
CENTER,
https://www.facebook.com/help/185747581553788
[https://perma.cc/73CFJ29E] (last visited Jan. 13, 2021) (explaining disabling of an account, with
possible reinstatement, for not following the Facebook Terms); Our Range of
Enforcement Options, TWITTER HELP CENTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rulesand-policies/enforcement-options [perma.cc/3234-MY7R] (last visited Jan. 13,
2021) (explaining that enforcement for violation of Twitter’s rules and policies
may include limiting tweet visibility and hiding a tweet while awaiting its
removal).
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controversial) exercise of this power.65 It is worrying that the
intellectual marketplace is increasingly consigned to the hidden
hands of a few corporations, especially when their employees
reportedly support causes and candidates of one political faction by
a large margin.66 Of course, nothing unseemly can necessarily be
inferred from lopsided, but otherwise legitimate, participation in
the political process. Still, it remains the case that these private
actors are effectively entrusted with guardianship of the public
discourse with minimal democratic oversight.67 Right now, citizens
can only depend on the platforms’ good faith. Such reliance
contradicts two principles of American political order: first, freedom
is not secure if it rests on the mere benevolence of those in charge;
second, unsupervised power inevitably runs amok.68

65. See Shannon Bond, Facebook and Twitter Limit Sharing ‘New York
Post’ Story About Joe Biden, NPR (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/
10/14/923766097/facebook-and-twitter-limit-sharing-new-york-post-storyabout-joe-biden [perma.cc/YK65-9ZZK]. Twitter’s ability to effortlessly color
public discourse is also evident in the “warning labels” it has affixed to many
of President Trump’s Tweets, which allegedly contain disputed or misleading
information. See Cat Zakrewski, The Technology 202: Trump’s Twitter feed is
covered
in
warning
labels,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
5,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/11/05/technology-202-trumptwitter-feed-is-covered-warning-labels/ [perma.cc/2RG9-NF5U].
66. See Robert Gearty, Google, Facebook and Twitter Staffs Splurge on
Democrats Ahead of Midterms, FOX NEWS (Oct. 23, 2018),
https://www.foxnews.com/tech/google-facebook-and-twitter-staffs-splurge-ondemocrats-ahead-of-midterms [perma.cc/4PTP-MRCF]; Ari Levy, A Shockingly
Small Number of People Donated to Trump at Facebook and Twitter, CNBC
(Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/03/trump-love-twitter-andfacebook-goes-unrequited.html [https://perma.cc/KZC4-6BUC].
67. Helena Rosenblatt & Vasant Dhar, Opinion, Social-media platforms
are undermining our democracy. Lawmakers need to step up to protect it., BUS.
INSIDER (Sep. 17, 2020, 8:43 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/socialmedia-platforms-facebook-google-twitter-undermining-democracy-2020-9
[perma.cc/VCP4-XLUJ].
68. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro
ed., Yale Univ. Press 2009). James Madison famously argued in support of the
Constitution:
It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be
necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is
government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were
to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government
would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be
administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you
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Given the ever-growing importance of social media platforms
to our democratic project, careful oversight and regulation of these
entities is more than justified. ESICA offers a creative means of
ensuring that the platforms remain open and available to all
citizens.
II. ESICA: PROTECTING THE PROMISE OF THE INTERNET’S “VAST
DEMOCRATIC FORUMS”

In Part I, this Comment assessed the relationships between
free speech, democracy, and the internet. It also considered the
threat to free speech—and consequently to democracy—posed by
potentially politically-biased content moderation on the major
social media platforms. It will now explore a possible solution to
this threat: ESICA. 69 Simply put, ESICA would help secure a
robust culture of democratic free speech on the internet by
predicating Section 230 immunities on politically neutral content
moderation policies. To appreciate what this solution means, it is
necessary to review the history and substance of Section 230. 70
A. The Origins of Section 230
One who publishes a false and injurious communication about
another is liable for defamation.71 Generally, one who repeats a
defamation is as liable as the original publisher. 72 However, the
law of torts generally exempts from liability one who acts as a “mere

must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the
next place oblige it to control itself.
Id.
69. See
S.
1914,
116th
Cong.
(2019),
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s1914/BILLS-116s1914is.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FP38-4DU8] (last visited Jan. 13, 2021).
70. For useful background and perspective on Section 230, as well as an
extended reflection on its relation to the First Amendment, see Note, Section
230 As First Amendment Rule, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2027 (2018).
71. DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 519 (2d ed. 2011) (defining defamation at common law and describing
its constitutional limitations). A publication is “any communication, by any
method, to one or more persons who can understand the meaning,” whether
intentional or negligent, including a failure to remove or prevent such a
publication. Id. at § 520.
72. Id. § 521.
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conduit” in the circulation of defamation.73 A conduit—also called
a distributor—is characterized by its “attenuated or mechanical”
transmission of offending material. 74 Traditionally, a distributor is
subject to liability only if it knows, or should know, that it is
reproducing
defamation.75
Bookstores are archetypal
distributors76 while newspapers are archetypal publishers, 77 even
as to content prepared by third parties (e.g., advertisements). 78
With the advent of the digital revolution, courts had to
determine whether internet services should be considered
publishers or distributors for the purpose of defamation liability.79
Ultimately, a lot rested on this classification: not only black-andwhite matters of legal exposure, but arguably the very character of
cyberspace.80
In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., the Southern District of
New York heard a case arising from the publication of defamatory
material by a third party to an electronic forum maintained by
defendant CompuServe.81 CompuServe hosted more than one
hundred and fifty similar forums.82 Because CompuServe exerted
minimal editorial control and processed a high volume of content,

73. Id.
74. Id. § 522.
75. Id.
76. See generally Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). Other wellestablished distributors include “telegraph and telephone companies, libraries
and news vendors.” DOBBS ET AL., supra note 71, § 522.
77. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974)
(treating appellant newspaper as a publisher in a First Amendment analysis).
78. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 71, § 522.
79. A brisk survey of this history is offered in Note, supra note 70, at 2028.
80. For Section 230’s role in the development of vibrant internet culture,
see id. at 2027, n.2. See also Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley,
63 EMORY L.J. 639, 653 (2014).
81. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). At
that time, CompuServe was a leading internet provider. Peter H. Lewis, The
Compuserve Edge: Delicate Data Balance, N.Y. TIMES (November 29, 1994),
https://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/29/science/personal-computers-thecompuserve-edge-delicate-data-balance.html [perma.cc/GS4F-B6GY].
Not
long after Cubby, it was crowned one of the “Big Three information services,”
alongside Prodigy and America Online. Id. Prodigy takes center stage in the
next case reviewed by this Comment.
82. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 137.
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the court likened CompuServe to a library or news vendor83 and,
therefore, held that it was a distributor subject to liability only if it
knew or should have known about the defamatory statements. 84
Four years later, in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services
Co., the New York Superior Court examined a similar case but
reached a different result.85 Stratton Oakmont also sprang from
defamatory third-party content posted to an online bulletin board.86
However, while the Cubby court found CompuServe to be a
distributor, the Stratton Oakmont court found Prodigy to be a
publisher.87 Unlike CompuServe, Prodigy explicitly embraced a
policy of supervising and moderating content, going so far as to
compare itself to a traditional newspaper. 88 The court reasoned
that Prodigy’s “conscious choice to gain the benefits of editorial
control ha[d] opened it up to greater liability.”89
Taken together, Cubby and Stratton Oakmont presented
something of a paradox. If an internet service refrained from
content moderation, it risked creating an environment conducive to
vulgar, offensive, and malicious speech, yet it enjoyed significant
immunity from liability; on the other hand, if an internet service
engaged in content moderation, it could cultivate a hospitable and
orderly environment, yet it exposed itself to considerable liability.
This dilemma led to widespread consternation.90 In the wake of
these decisions, a prominent industry lawyer opined that the

83. Id. at 140. As the Cubby court explained:
A computerized database is the functional equivalent of a more
traditional news vendor, and the inconsistent application of a lower
standard of liability to an electronic news distributor such as
CompuServe than that which is applied to a public library, book store,
or newsstand would impose an undue burden on the free flow of
information.
Id.
84. Id. at 140–41.
85. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL
323710, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
86. Id.
87. Id. at *4.
88. Id. at *2.
89. Id. at *5.
90. See Jessica R. Friedman, Defamation, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 794, 799
nn.580–82 (1995).
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distinction was “[l]ikely to be short-lived.”91
The lawyer’s
prediction proved prescient.
Congressman Chris Cox learned about the Stratton Oakmont
decision shortly after it was handed down.92 It occurred to him that
the ruling would disincentivize internet services from policing
content, rendering cyberspace a “cesspool.” 93 Cox immediately
initiated a legislative effort to protect the well-being of the infant
digital world, lest it be smothered in the cradle.94 This effort, which
was shepherded through the upper chamber by Senator Ron
Wyden, culminated in 1996 with the bipartisan passage of Section
509 of the Communications Decency Act, codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 230.95 Wyden later explained that “the goal [of Section 230] was
to protect the unique ability of the Internet to be the proverbial
marketplace of ideas while ensuring that mainstream sites could
reflect the ethics of society as a whole.”96 Simply put, Section 230
aimed to grant traditional distributor immunity to internet services
without depriving them of the editorial oversight typically
associated with publishers. 97

91. Id. at 799 n.580 (quoting Kent D. Stuckey, Rights and Responsibilities
of Information Service Providers, in BUSINESS & LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE
INTERNET & ONLINE SERVICES 203, 220 (Lance Rose & Shari Steele eds., 1995)).
92. Mark Sullivan, The 1996 law that made the web is in the crosshairs,
FAST COMPANY (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90273352/
maybe-its-time-to-take-away-the-outdated-loophole-that-big-tech-exploits
[perma.cc/KLN9-426T].
93. Alina Selyukh, Section 230: A Key Legal Shield for Facebook, Google,
Is
About
to
Change,
NPR
(March
21,
2018),
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2018/03/21/591622450/section230-a-key-legal-shield-for-facebook-google-is-about-to-change
[perma.cc/BE9J-TQB2].
94. Id.
95. The Supreme Court struck down portions of the Communications
Decency Act in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 878–79 (1997). Additionally,
Congress recently amended Section 230 to remove potential safe harbors for
internet services that facilitate sex trafficking. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5).
96. Ron Wyden, The Consequences of Indecency, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 23,
2018),
https://techcrunch.com/2018/08/23/the-consequences-of-indecency/
[perma.cc/6E5M-2TLS].
97. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
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B. The Scope and Substance of Section 230
Section 230 establishes that “no provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information by another information content
provider.”98 Furthermore, the statute removes liability from any
“provider or user of an interactive computer service” who “in good
faith . . . restrict[s] access to or availability of material” deemed
“obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected.”99
In the years since Congress passed Section 230, state and
federal courts have dramatically enlarged the scope of the
immunity it provides. For instance, in Zeran v. America Online,
Inc., the Fourth Circuit precluded even the application of
traditional notice-based distributor liability, reasoning that
Congress intended to encourage “unfettered speech on the
Internet.”100 Subsequent holdings extended Section 230 bit by bit,
so that today it is thought to overcome almost any claim relating to
third-party content, defeating causes of action ranging from
interference with contract to computer fraud.101

98. Id. An “interactive computer service” means “any information service,
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access
by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or
system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or
services offered by libraries or educational institutions.” Id. § 230(f)(2).
99. Id. § 230(c)(2).
100. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir. 1997). See also
id. at 330 (“By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any
cause of action that would make service providers liable for information
originating with a third-party user of the service.”).
101. See Chander, supra note 80, at 653 n.58 (cataloguing cases); see also
Michal Lavi, Content Providers’ Secondary Liability: A Social Network
Perspective, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 855, 869 (2016)
(“After Zeran, [Section] 230 repeatedly shielded web enterprises from lawsuits
in a plethora of cases. Courts have found that content providers that host
harmful content are immune to liability, even if they failed to screen harmful
content, and even after being notified of the harmful content.” (footnotes
omitted)). The Supreme Court has yet to determine the contours of Section
230, although Justice Thomas recently critiqued lower courts for interpreting
the statute overbroadly. See Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Grp.
USA, L.L.C., No. 19–1284, slip op. at 6–7 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2020) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari).
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In short, providers now enjoy extraordinary risk-free
discretion. Whether they fastidiously moderate content or let
anarchy reign, they are shielded from potentially fatal lawsuits by
the sturdy bulwark of Section 230.
C. Section 230 Under Fire
Despite widespread praise from tech advocates and repeated
success in the courts, Section 230 has lately come under fire from
liberals and conservatives alike.102 Liberal criticism generally
assumes two forms. First, there are those who argue that the free
speech culture enabled by Section 230 allows hateful ideas to thrive
in cyberspace, fortifying inequitable power dynamics and
motivating violence against peripheral communities. 103 In this
view, online speech, far from being “free,” comes at the expense of
marginalized peoples: “First Amendment advocates will often just
assume that it’s okay for black and brown people to bear the brunt
102. This is not to say that Section 230 is without supporters on both wings
of the political spectrum, as evidenced by the negative response of some liberals
and conservatives to President Trump’s May 2020 Executive Order on
Preventing Online Censorship. See Peter Baker & Daisuke Wakabayashi,
Trump’s Order on Social Media Could Harm One Person in Particular: Donald
Trump,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
28,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/us/politics/trump-jack-dorsey.html
[perma.cc/V9Z4-GPAD] (note particularly the comments of Kate Ruane of the
American Civil Liberties Union and Patrick Hedger of the Competitive
Enterprise Institute); see also infra note 207. Indeed, some of the most spirited
defenses of Section 230 have come from the right. See, e.g., David French,
Section 230: Donald Trump v. Twitter, THE DISPATCH (May 29, 2020),
https://thedispatch.com/p/section-230-donald-trump-vs-twitter
[perma.cc/F95E-PM75] (writing in the context of President Trump’s executive
order).
103. See Andrew Marantz, Free Speech Is Killing Us, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/opinion/sunday/free-speechsocial-media-violence.html
[perma.cc/CJD5-BEHW]
(advocating
a
reassessment of online free speech culture, including a “rethinking” of Section
230, in light of purported real world consequences). But see Elizabeth Nolan
Brown, Section 230 Is the Internet’s First Amendment. Now Both Republicans
and Democrats Want To Take It Away, REASON (Aug. 29, 2018),
https://reason.com/2019/07/29/section-230-is-the-internets-first-amendmentnow-both-republicans-and-democrats-want-to-take-it-away/
[https://perma.cc/SX5G-9T46] (“Ending or amending Section 230 wouldn’t
make life difficult just for Google, Facebook, Twitter, and the rest of today’s
biggest online platforms. Eroding the law would seriously jeopardize free
speech for everyone, particularly marginalized groups whose ideas don’t sit
easily with the mainstream.”).
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of white free speech.”104 Second, there are those who believe that
the social media giants have failed to adequately guard the gates of
American democracy, using Section 230 as an excuse to act
negligently in the face of foreign election meddling and domestic
misinformation campaigns. For instance, then Senator, and now
Vice President, Kamala Harris promised to hold “accountable”
those platforms “act[ing] as a megaphone for misinformation or
cyberwarfare.”105 And Speaker Nancy Pelosi warned that Section
230 is a “privilege” that “could be removed.” 106 Perhaps most
importantly, President Joe Biden has straightforwardly stated that
Section 230 “should be revoked, immediately,” framing his
opposition in terms of fairness and responsibility. 107
Conservative criticism of Section 230 is rooted in the
widespread conviction that the major social media platforms are
biased against right-wing users.108 Conservatives are especially
suspicious of Twitter, which some charge with undertaking covert

104. Elie Mystal, Alex Jones Has Been Banned…Let’s See If Free Speech
Still Exists, ABOVE THE LAW (Aug. 7, 2018), https://abovethelaw.com/2018/
08/alex-jones-has-been-banned-lets-check-if-free-speech-still-exists/
[https://perma.cc/F2RL-WX6W].
105. See Ryan Brooks, Democrats Running For President Say Social Media
Companies Have A White Nationalist Problem. Some Think Regulation Should
Be The Answer, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 21, 2019), https://www.buzzfeednews.
com/article/ryancbrooks/2020-regulate-social-media-white-nationalismfacebook [perma.cc/S9G2-QRAT].
106. Transcript of Nancy Pelosi’s interview with Kara Swisher,
Decode/Recode,
VOX
(Apr.
12,
2019),
https://www.vox.com/2019/4/12/18307957/nancy-pelosi-donald-trump-twittertweet-cheap-freak-presidency-kara-swisher-decode-podcast-interview
[https://perma.cc/9N72-44KC].
107. The New York Times Editorial Board, Interview with Joe Biden, N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
17,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/17/opinion/joe-biden-nytimesinterview.html [perma.cc/GAF6-HNBU].
108. See Jessica Guynn, Ted Cruz threatens to regulate Facebook, Google,
and Twitter over charges of anti-conservative bias, USA TODAY (Apr. 10,
2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2019/04/10/ted-cruz-threatensregulate-facebook-twitter-over-alleged-bias/3423095002/
[perma.cc/4HTKWEYS]; see also Matt Clinch, Trump claims social media firms are
discriminating against conservative voices, CNBC (Aug. 18, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/18/trump-claims-social-media-firms-arediscriminating-against-conservative-voices.html [perma.cc/P699-MALT].
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“shadow banning” campaigns.109 Undoubtedly, the conservative
critique stems partly from a generalized mistrust of the corporate
goliaths of digital communication, which are viewed as elite
institutions captive to the liberal agenda: “Big Tech undoubtedly is
. . . run by left-wing political activists who, similar to deep state
operatives within the U.S. government, want to stop President
Trump from getting reelected.”110 President Trump has channeled
the collective frustration of conservatives by publicly calling for the
revocation of Section 230.111
Hawley introduced ESICA within this context of bipartisan
concern about the power and influence of major social media
platforms. The bill aims to ensure that online political discourse is
fair, transparent, and characterized by accountability.112 It would
obtain this result by predicating Section 230 immunity on
politically unbiased content moderation.
D. The Proposal: Predicated Immunity Under ESICA
Under ESICA, interactive computer services of a certain size or
profitability—“covered companies”113—would no longer enjoy

109. See Liam Stack, What Is a ‘Shadow Ban,’ and Is Twitter Doing It to
Republican
Accounts?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
26,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/us/politics/twitter-shadowbanning.html
[perma.cc/LEE2-CBK3].
110. Adriana Cohen, Big Tech Cuts Out Conservatives, REALCLEAR POLITICS
(May 10, 2019), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2019/05/10/big_
tech_cuts_out_conservatives_140296.html [perma.cc/V9YV-ZCHK].
111. See sources cited supra note 2. Conservative suspicion of Big Tech and
hostility toward Section 230 has only increased in the aftermath of the 2020
general elections. See, e.g., Jaclyn Diaz, Trump Vows To Veto Defense Bill
Unless Shield For Big Tech Is Scrapped, NPR (Dec. 2, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/12/02/941019533/trump-vows-to-veto-defense-billunless-shield-for-big-tech-is-scrapped [perma.cc/2WRZ-J9XQ]; Francesca
Tripodi, Conservatives Are Gearing Up to Falsely Blame Big Tech Censorship
for
Trump’s
Loss,
SLATE
(Nov.
9,
2020),
https://slate.com/technology/2020/11/big-tech-conservative-bias-trumpelection-voter-suppression.html [perma.cc/HEH6-6FUP].
112. Press Release, Senator Hawley Introduces Legislation to Amend
Section 230 Immunity for Big Tech Companies, U.S. SENATE (June 19, 2019),
https://www.hawley.senate.gov/senator-hawley-introduces-legislation-amendsection-230-immunity-big-tech-companies [perma.cc/RQD4-WT2F].
113. See generally S. 1914, 116th Cong. sec. 2(a)(2) (2019),
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s1914/BILLS-116s1914is.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J49Y-TF9E] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021).
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Section 230 immunity by default.114 Instead, such entities would
enjoy Section 230 immunity by acquiring an “immunity
certification” from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 115 The
FTC would give immunity certifications upon a showing of
politically unbiased content moderation. 116 Moderation would be
deemed biased if:
[It] is designed to negatively affect a political party,
political
candidate,
or
political
viewpoint;
or
disproportionately restricts or promotes access to, or the
availability of, information from a political party, political
candidate, or political viewpoint; or [if] an officer or
employee of the provider makes a decision about
moderating information provided by other information
content providers that is motivated by an intent to
negatively affect a political party, political candidate, or
political viewpoint. 117
Moderation that might otherwise be biased within the meaning of
the statute would be permitted if “necessary for business,” or if the
target content is not “protected under the First Amendment . . .
[and] there is no available alternative that has a less
disproportionate effect, and the provider does not act with the
intent to discriminate based on political [affiliation, party, or
viewpoint].”118

114. See id. sec. 2(a)(1). All of the major social media platforms would
qualify as covered companies. See Dustin W. Stout, Social Media Statistics
2020: Top Networks By the Numbers, DUSTIN STOUT BLOG
https://dustinstout.com/social-media-statistics/#twitter-stats [perma.cc/SGQ6SGE4] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021).
115. S. 1914, 116th Cong. sec. 2(a)(1), § (c)(3)(A), (B) (2019),
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s1914/BILLS-116s1914is.pdf
[perma.cc/N7K8-ZQMB] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021).
116. Id. sec. 2(a)(1), § (c)(3)(A). For a definition of “moderate,” see id. sec.
2(a)(2), § (f)(6) (note that it includes both human and algorithmic moderation).
117. Id. sec. 2(a)(1), § (c)(3)(B)(ii).
118. Id. sec. 2(a)(1), § (c)(3)(B)(iii)(I). Business necessity is defined as a
“lawful act that advances the growth, development, or profitability of a
company but does not include any action designed to appeal to, or gain favor
from, persons or groups because of their political beliefs, political party
membership, or support for political candidates.” Id. sec. 2(a)(2), §(f)(7).
Presumably, this exception would permit the moderation of content that runs
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Covered companies would be required to go before the FTC
every two years119 and demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that, during the preceding period, they had engaged in
politically neutral content moderation.120 The certification process
would invite public input.121 Dissenting opinions with respect to
certification would be published.122 Costs of certification would be
borne by the applicant.123
E. Criticism of ESICA
Since its release, ESICA has received significant criticism.
Some of this criticism is misguided, insofar as it focuses on Hawley’s
purported belief that Section 230 immunity was motivated
primarily by a commitment to “true diversity of political [opinion]”
online.124 If this is indeed Hawley’s opinion—and it is the opinion
of some conservatives125—it seems not to be wholly accurate.
Although Congress wished to protect the open exchange of ideas,126
a goal recognized by the courts,127 Section 230 was not
fundamentally concerned with viewpoint diversity online.128
Whatever Hawley’s personal perspective, ESICA is mute as to the
original meaning of Section 230.129
Other criticism focuses on the practical effects of ESICA. Some
critics fear that the removal of Section 230 immunity would: (1)
create a cataclysmic deluge of moderation requests, (2) lead to overafoul of typical terms of service agreements, such as harassing behavior,
abusive language, or criminality.
119. Id. sec. 2(a)(1), § (c)(3)(C)(i).
120. Id. sec. 2(a)(1), § (c)(3)(B)(i)(III).
121. Id. sec. 2(a)(1), § (c)(3)(B)(iv)(IV).
122. Id. sec. 2(a)(1), § (c)(3)(B)(iv)(III).
123. Id. sec. 2(a)(1), § (c)(3)(D)(i).
124. See Brown, supra note 103.
125. See generally Elliott Harmon, No, Section 230 Does Not Require
Platforms to Be “Neutral,” ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 12, 2018),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/04/no-section-230-does-not-requireplatforms-be-neutral [perma.cc/TC4Q-B9NK].
126. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3).
127. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir. 1997).
128. See supra Section II.B.
129. S. 1914, 116th Cong. (2019), https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/
s1914/BILLS-116s1914is.pdf.
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policing of content, and/or (3) enable bad actors to suppress the
speech of opponents through cynical manipulation. 130 Of course,
such nightmare scenarios presume that the major social media
platforms would fail to render their content moderation policies
ESICA compliant—a dubious conjecture. Still other critics have
reacted negatively to ESICA due to anxiety about overweening
federal regulators who would, far from eliminating bias, simply
entrench their own biases.131 Finally, some critics have noted that
ESICA sweeps in many platforms that have no relation to the
purported problem of politically biased content moderation,
unnecessarily burdening important players in online recreation
(Twitch) and commerce (eBay).132
Such objections are worthy of serious reflection. However, this
Comment will restrict itself to tackling a constitutional objection:
specifically, that ESICA compels speech in violation of the First
Amendment.133
III. ESICA—SECURING, NOT COMPELLING, FREE SPEECH ONLINE

The compelled speech case against ESICA runs as follows. The
bill predicates a critical government benefit on adherence to a
government-mandated moderation policy, forcing covered
companies to adopt a potentially disagreeable content curation
policy or face ruinous legal and financial consequences. While not
an unreasonable argument, this Comment contends that ESICA is
130. See Brown, supra note 103. One commentator argued:
Without Section 230, companies would thus be more likely to simply
delete all user-flagged content, whether the report has merit or not,
or at least immediately hide reported content as a review proceeds.
It’s easy to imagine massive backlogs of challenged content, much of
it flagged strategically by bad actors for reasons having nothing to do
with either safety or veracity. Silencing one’s opponents would be
easy.
Id.
131. Hawley Proposes a Fairness Doctrine for the Internet, TECH FREEDOM
(June 19, 2019), https://techfreedom.org/hawley-proposes-a-fairness-doctrinefor-the-internet/ [https://perma.cc/6C9S-8MCC].
132. See Goldman, supra note 8.
133. See, e.g., Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., How Conservatives’ Campaign to
Impose Political Neutrality Regulation on Big Tech Will Backfire, FORBES (Dec.
23, 2019, 1:32 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/waynecrews/2019/12/23/howconservatives-effort-to-impose-political-neutrality-regulation-on-big-tech-willbackfire/ [perma.cc/C9WN-NCEY].
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fundamentally dissimilar to laws that have been struck down for
impermissibly compelling speech and that it therefore has a decent
chance of escaping a constitutional challenge from the major social
media platforms on this basis.
A. An Overview of Compelled Speech Doctrine
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”134 This constitutional
guarantee not only protects the right to speak, but also the right
not to speak: “[S]peech compulsions . . . are as constitutionally
suspect as . . . speech restrictions.”135 Indeed, perhaps the “cardinal
constitutional command”136 is that “no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
act their faith therein.”137
Although the Free Speech Clause is simple on its face, it has
produced a doctrinal “labyrinth.”138 In traditional speech restraint
analysis (i.e., analysis concerning direct curtailment of speech), the
chief concern is preventing “purposeful government censorship”139
and the primary inquiry is whether a government regulation is
content-based or content-neutral.140 A regulation is content-based
if it explicitly identifies speech based on the “ideas or messages it
express[es].”141 Such regulations are subject to strict scrutiny and
only pass constitutional muster if the government can demonstrate
134. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
135. Eugene Volokh, The Law of Compelled Speech, 97 TX. L. REV. 355, 355
(2018). This Comment makes appreciative use of Professor Volokh’s compelled
speech framework.
136. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Employees, Council 31, 138
S. Ct. 2448, 2463 (2018).
137. W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
138. Kevin Francis O’Neill, A First Amendment Compass: Navigating the
Speech Clause with A Five-Step Analytical Framework, 29 SW. U. L. REV. 223,
225 (2000).
139. See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Pledges, Parades, and Mandatory Payments,
52 RUTGERS L. REV. 123, 127 (1999).
140. See id. at 126–29.
141. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015). A regulation is
also content-based if, while facially neutral, it can only be explained by
“reference to the regulated speech,” or if it was implemented based on
government disapproval of its content. Id.
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that they are “narrowly tailored to serve compelling state
interests.”142 On the other hand, a regulation of speech is contentneutral if it “confer[s] benefits or imposes burdens on speech
without reference to the ideas or views expressed.”143 Such
regulations are subject to intermediate scrutiny, which means that
they will be upheld if the government can show that they further
an “important or substantial governmental interest . . . unrelated
to the suppression of free expression[,] and if the incidental
restriction of alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”144
Speech restraint doctrine is complicated but (relatively)
coherent. Contrarily, compelled speech doctrine is “a patchwork of
cases with no clear thread that ties them together.”145 Although
the Court has applied some of the concepts and terminology of the
former to the latter, the transposition has been inconsistent at
best, 146 with the Court often justifying its decisions with “seemingly
case-specific distinctions and analogies” and “highly debatable

142. Id. at 2226.
143. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994). “The
principal inquiry in determining content neutrality . . . is whether the
government has adopted a regulation . . . because of disagreement with [its]
message.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). Content
neutral laws are typified by regulation of the “time, place, and manner” of
speech, regardless of its content. Id.
144. Turner, 512 U.S. at 662. Other routine inquiries examine where the
relevant speech occurs, whether the speech falls into an unprotected category,
whether the speech involves a commercial transaction, and the whether the
state is speaking or subsidizing speech. See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The
First Amendment Structure for Speakers and Speech, 44 SETON HALL L. REV.
395, 403–04 (2014); see also Jacobs, supra note 139, at 129.
145. Jacobs, supra note 139, at 125.
146. For instance, the Court has identified certain compelled speech laws
as content-based and applied strict scrutiny thereto. See Nat’l Inst. of Family
& Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2374−78 (2018) (striking down a
regulation requiring pro-life crisis pregnancy centers to post state-drafted
notifications about publicly-funded abortions). Yet, it has dealt with seemingly
similar laws without describing them as content-based or expressly applying
strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714–17 (1977)
(striking down laws requiring vehicles to display license plate with
philosophically-charged state motto—“Live Free or Die”—and penalizing any
defacement of words on said plates). Indeed, Wooley leaned on two cases
employing intermediate scrutiny. See Jacobs, supra note 139, at 140.
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factual judgments.”147 Even where the Court has applied the
language of speech restraint jurisprudence, it has often imbued that
language with different meaning.148 Thus, while the general
outline of compelled speech jurisprudence may be settled, “its
details are often hard to pin down” and “major uncertainties” and
“internal tensions” abound.149
Ultimately, compelled speech analysis is a fact-intensive
process that involves not the application of a single test, but
multiple distinct yet interrelated inquiries150 informed by broad
principles derived from “clusters of holdings.” 151 These principles
are in turn derived from a hodgepodge of landmark cases, some
with idiosyncratic fact patterns, which this Comment will now
consider.
B. Compelled Speech: Landmarks and Principles
Compelled speech laws can be divided into two categories:
speech compulsions as speech restrictions and pure speech
compulsions.152
Speech compulsions are speech restrictions when government
laws have the effect of curbing, limiting, or otherwise preventing a
person from speaking as he or she would have spoken but for the
compelled speech regulation.153
A law requiring newspapers to print replies from individuals
criticized in its pages falls into this bucket. In Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, the Court knocked down such a “rightof-access” statute, reasoning that it ran roughshod over editorial
discretion and imposed economic penalties for publishing content

147. Id. at 138.
148. Id. at 125 (“[W]hile the labels are the same, their meanings and
apparent significance in constitutional analysis are not. For example,
although the Court purports to evaluate whether compelled expression
requirements are ‘content-based,’ it has attached at least four different
meanings to the label.”).
149. Volokh, supra note 135, at 356–57.
150. Jacobs, supra note 139, at 162–63.
151. Nat Stern, The Subordinate Status of Negative Speech Rights, 59 BUFF.
L. REV. 847, 850 (2011) (describing compelled speech doctrine as “sprawling
and ungainly”).
152. See Volokh, supra note 135, at 358.
153. See generally id. at 359–366.
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critical of public figures, thus chilling civic discourse.154 Similarly,
the Court held unconstitutional a state regulator’s order requiring
a utility to occasionally include in its mass mailings a newsletter
prepared by an adversarial interest group.155 The Court reasoned
that, as in Tornillo, the order forced the utility to “associate” with
disagreeable opinions and bear the costs of distributing the same,
thereby presenting the risk that it might simply “avoid controversy”
rather than “disseminate hostile views.”156
A government speech compulsion also serves to impermissibly
restrict speech where it forces a speaker to incorporate some
undesirable element into a “coherent speech product.”157 In Hurley
v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,
the Court observed that a parade is an expressive act comprised of
multiple meaningful units (floats, banners, uniformed contingents,
etc.), each with its own meaning, and the Court therefore held that
the forced inclusion of a unit communicating beliefs repugnant to
the parade’s organizers unacceptably infringed on their “autonomy
to choose the content of their own message.”158 Likewise, in
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA),
the Court found that a law requiring pro-life crisis pregnancy
centers to post or distribute a state-drafted information sheet
concerning government-funded abortion opportunities ran afoul of
First Amendment guarantees because it “alter[ed] the content” of
the centers’ speech.159 Hurley and NIFLA stand for the proposition
that speech is sometimes an aggregative phenomenon consisting of
many discrete communicative units. 160
Where speech is
aggregative, the compelled inclusion of a disagreeable
communicative unit has the potential to change the whole gist of

154. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257–58 (1974).
155. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 20
(1986).
156. Id. at 13–15.
157. Volokh, supra note 135, at 361.
158. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515
U.S. 557, 572–73 (1995).
159. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371
(2018).
160. See Volokh, supra note 135, at 363.
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the message and is therefore suspect on First Amendment
grounds.161
However, in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights (FAIR), the Court considered a law that required schools to
afford equal access to military recruiters on campus or risk losing
federal funds.162
Some schools protested that facilitating
recruitment entailed speech acts, such as posting signs and sending
e-mails.163 The Court reasoned that the accommodation of military
recruiters was not “inherently expressive,” and that any incidental
communication did not appreciably “interfere with any message
from the school[s]” as to their approval or disapproval of military
policy.164 Furthermore, the Court identified no danger that the
recruiters’ views would be attributed to the schools.165 Similarly,
in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, the Court ruled that a
state law requiring the accommodation of guest speakers in private
shopping centers did not transgress the First Amendment. 166 The
shopping centers’ owners argued that the requirement that they
host speakers amounted to compelled speech.167 The Court
disagreed, finding that the owners were not being made to “affirm
. . . any governmentally prescribed position or view,” that they
could easily “dissociate” themselves from the speakers, and that
there was no danger of dampening public debate by penalizing
editorial discretion.168
Pure speech compulsions are especially offensive because they
make a person “speak things they do not want to speak.”169 A law
requiring students to pledge allegiance to the American flag is an
archetypal instance of a pure speech compulsion. 170 However, the
principle has a broader reach. For instance, in Wooley v. Maynard,
the Court found unconstitutional a law forcing drivers to display

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See id.
Rumsfeld v. Forum For Acad. & Inst. Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 47 (2006).
Id. at 61–62.
See id. at 64–65.
Id. at 66.
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 75, 76, 88 (1980).
Id. at 87–88.
Id. at 88.
Volokh, supra note 135, at 368.
See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1942).

2021]

FREE SPEECH

191

the New Hampshire state motto—“Live Free or Die”—on their
license plates, reasoning that it effectively drafted drivers to serve
as “couriers” of an ideological message crafted by the state. 171
Based on the cases discussed above, a court might find that a
law impermissibly compels speech if it:
(1) imposes a prohibitive financial cost for accommodating
speech, thereby dissuading speakers from addressing
controversial matters; 172
(2) unduly interferes with editorial discretion;173
(3) exclusively advantages the speech of an adversarial
party;174
(4) drafts a person into the role of “courier” for state ideology,175
or otherwise make them “affirm [a] governmentally prescribed
position or view[;]”176
(5) forces the inclusion of an expressive unit into an intelligible
aggregative speech act, thus changing its meaning;177 and/or
(6) involves the accommodation178 of another’s speech in a
manner or context that: (a) does not allow the host to plainly
“disavow any identity of viewpoint” with the accommodated
speaker, or (b) suggests that the host approves of the
accommodated speech.179
171. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977). Interestingly, Justice
Rehnquist dissented, arguing that the state motto would not be reasonably
imputed to the driver, thus emphasizing the attenuation theme that arguably
proved decisive in Rumsfeld and PruneYard. See id. at 721–22 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
172. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974).
173. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 10–11
(1986); Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
174. See Pac. Gas & Elect. Co., 475 U.S. at 12–13.
175. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715–17.
176. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).
177. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371
(2018); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S.
557, 568–69, 578 (1995).
178. Many of the accommodation cases involve requirements to host
speakers on one’s premises (FAIR, PruneYard), but “accommodation”
ultimately has a broader definition, as the Court placed the right-to-access
laws of Pacific Gas and Tornillo in this category. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 63 (2006).
179. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576; PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87; Wooley, 430 U.S.
at 721–22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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C. ESICA and Compelled Speech
Based on the foregoing principles, and for the following
reasons, ESICA arguably would not impermissibly compel speech
from major social media platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and
Twitter.
1. The nature of digital media substantially diminishes
traditional concerns about the prohibitive costs of accommodating
speech
In Tornillo, where a right-to-access law required newspapers
to give column space to public figures criticized in their pages, the
Court highlighted the prohibitive costs of accommodating speech in
the context of print media.180 The Court worried that newspapers,
faced with finite space and averse to additional editing and printing
expenses, would opt to remain silent about controversial topics
rather than bear the costs of accommodating speech.181 This
rationale is closely tied to the nature of print media; therefore, it is
largely inapplicable to digital media, which lacks the inherent
limitations of the former mode of communication. True, ESICA
might require social media platforms to host accounts and content
that would otherwise be suspended or removed. However, the vast
scale at which the platforms operate would likely render the burden
of accommodation de minimis. Indeed, ESICA could conceivably
reduce costs by narrowing the scope of content susceptible to
moderation.
2. ESICA would not interfere with editorial discretion because
the major social media platforms do not exercise conventional
editorial discretion
Editorial discretion is the deliberate selection of material for
publication according to the publisher’s tastes and aims. 182
Editorial discretion is fundamentally communicative. It announces
a considered value judgment: X is beautiful, Y is true, Z is
180. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974); see also
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 29–30 (1986)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
181. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256–57.
182. Here, the term “publisher” should be understood broadly enough to
embrace a newspaper and a cable news operator.
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newsworthy.183 From this perspective, the major social media
platforms exercise negligible editorial discretion. Rather, they are
best described as “passive receptacle[s] or conduit[s]”184 for torrents
of variegated content published by independent users. 185 The
millions of content units that pour through Twitter, Facebook, and
YouTube daily are inexpressibly diverse. Moreover, users generate
content proactively, normally posting without review or
permission. 186 Therefore, it is absurd to suggest that the major
social media platforms exercise meaningful editorial discretion in
the conventional meaning of that term.
True, the social media platforms are not entirely laissez-faire
in their approach to content. They sometimes remove posts that
are abusive, obscene, illegal, or otherwise contrary to broadlyframed terms of service.187 Similarly, at least one major social
media platform labels posts that contain misleading information
and disputed or unverified claims.188 Finally, every platform

183. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636–37 (1994) (“Through
‘original programming or by exercising editorial discretion over which stations
or programs to include in its repertoire,’ cable programmers and operators
‘see[k] to communicate messages on a wide variety of topics and in a wide
variety of formats.’” (quoting Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’n, Inc., 476 U.S.
488, 494 (1986) (emphasis added))).
184. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
185. For instance, in May 2020, Twitter users generated an average of 500
million tweets per day. David Sayce, The Number of Tweets per day in 2020,
https://www.dsayce.com/social-media/tweets-day/#more-313 [perma.cc/7CJ3XZCA] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021). Almost none of these tweets were
commissioned or screened by Twitter before their publication. Nunes v.
Twitter, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 3d 959, 967 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“Twitter does not
‘review’ the content of tweets. It does not ‘edit’ the content of tweets. It does
not make decisions about whether to send out a tweet.”). The other major
social media platforms have comparably enormous figures. See, e.g., Mansoor
Iqbal, YouTube Revenue and Usage Statistics (2020), BUS. OF APPS (Oct. 15,
2020),
https://www.businessofapps.com/data/youtube-statistics/
[https://perma.cc/LQZ6-M8TV] (500 hours of video uploaded on YouTube every
minute).
186. See, e.g., Nunes, 194 F. Supp. 3d at 967.
187. See, e.g., The Twitter Rules, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rulesand-policies/twitter-rules [https://perma.cc/X8YZ-P8ZK] (last visited Jan. 14,
2021).
188. Updating our approach to misleading information, TWITTER,
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/product/2020/updating-our-approach-tomisleading-information.html [perma.cc/2PZT-47L6] (last visited Jan. 14,

194 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:160
employs sophisticated and rather mysterious algorithms to
prioritize content per user preferences.189
Yet these interventions, such as they are, do not amount to
editorial discretion in the traditional sense. Imagine a newspaper
that published millions of reader letters on a daily basis. Now
imagine that these minimally reviewed, independently generated
letters comprised almost the entirety of the newspaper’s content.
Would a reasonable person hold that this newspaper exercised
editorial discretion—even if it occasionally retracted a letter for
containing abusive language or advancing a flagrantly untrue
claim?
The major social media platforms’ business model may be
characterized as “come one, come all.” ESICA would simply
incentivize the platforms to observe this relatively hands-off
approach with respect to political content.
3. ESICA would not exclusively advantage the speech of
adversarial parties
In Tornillo and Pacific Gas, the Court signaled its suspicion of
laws that force speakers to solely foreground antagonistic
opinions.190 However, ESICA would not require the major social
media platforms to extend special solicitude to the speech of
adversarial parties.191 The platforms would not have to give voices
with which they disagree a privileged position from which to speak,
nor would they have to prominently and exclusively display
contrary opinions.

2021). Exactly how Twitter applies these labels is unclear. See id. (referencing
“internal systems” and reliance on “trusted partners”).
189. See, e.g., Joshua Boyd, The Facebook Algorithm Explained,
BRANDWATCH (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.brandwatch.com/blog/the-facebookalgorithm-explained/;
What
are
Promoted
Tweets?,
TWITTER,
https://business.twitter.com/en/help/overview/what-are-promoted-trends.html
[https://perma.cc/CE7N-NNB3] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021).
190. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 14
(1986); see also Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974).
191. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 5–7, 13 (“Access is limited to
persons or groups . . . who disagree with appellant’s views . . . and who oppose
appellant in Commission proceedings. Such one-sidedness impermissibly
burdens appellant’s own expression.”); see also Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 243–44.
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4. ESICA would not make the major social media platforms
“couriers” of state ideology
The Court has evinced hostility toward laws that make
individuals “couriers” of state ideology. 192
Such laws are
unconstitutional because they force speakers to “foster” statesanctioned messages, forging an undesired “associat[ion]” between
the state’s ideology and its unwilling messengers. 193 Thus, the
Court in Barnette struck down a law requiring school children to
recite the national pledge of allegiance194 and in Wooley struck
down a law requiring drivers to display a philosophically-charged
motto on their license plates. 195 However, these cases are
inapposite. While ESICA might require platforms to maintain
political content produced by state actors—content the platforms
would otherwise remove for one reason or another—it would
simultaneously protect, and thus indirectly foster, content critical
of state propaganda. Additionally, there is little danger that
reasonable observers would impute the opinions of these actors to
the platforms themselves. 196 Finally, ESICA would help platforms
resist state pressure to suppress adversarial content—pressure to
which platforms have bowed in the past197—by providing a
readymade legal justification for hewing to politically neutral
content moderation. Far from drafting the major social media
platforms into the service of the state, or some party that
192. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715–17 (1977); see also W. Va.
State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 625–26, 628–29 (1943).
193. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715, 717 n.15.
194. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
195. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707.
196. See id. at 720–22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“For First Amendment
principles to be implicated, the State must place the citizen in the position of
either apparently or actually ‘asserting as true’ the message.”). Although
Justice Rehnquist found himself in the Wooley minority, his reasoning proved
important in later cases, including PruneYard and FAIR, discussed infra
Section III.C.6. Moreover, as already noted, the Wooley majority concedes,
albeit implicitly, the analytical significance of the imputation of the state’s
message to the messenger. See id., 430 U.S. at 715, 717 n.15 (majority opinion).
197. See, e.g., Erik Wemple, Facebook admits error in censoring anti-Obama
message, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/erik-wemple/post/facebook-admits-error-in-censoring-anti-obamamessage/2012/10/31/d6063c22-235e-11e2-ac85-e669876c6a24_blog.html
[perma.cc/B9XL-D3EZ].
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participates in the governance thereof, ESICA would ensure that
the platforms mature into neutral fora for lively democratic
discourse.
5. ESICA would not alter the content of the major social media
platforms’ speech because there is no coherent speech product to
alter
The content that populates the major social media platforms is
not integrated or arranged so as to sound an intelligible “common
theme”198 that might be changed by the inclusion of discordant
material. The major social media platforms are therefore dissimilar
to the parade in Hurley, which the Court viewed as a discrete and
orderly event with a relatively discernible cultural message. 199 Nor
are the platforms comparable to the crisis pregnancy centers in
NIFLA, whose medical advice was governed by an ideological
opposition to abortion.200 Rather, the platforms act as “passive
receptacles” for spontaneous and ever-mutating user-generated
content.201
Some may respond that the Court already views the major
social media platforms as coherent speech products. 202 However,
the Court has acknowledged the fluidity of internet free speech law,
which is tied to the technology’s “protean” quality. 203 There is no
reasonable basis for regarding these platforms as “coherent speech
products” worthy of heightened First Amendment protection, given
the nature of the medium.

198. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S.
557, 576 (1995).
199. Id. at 569–70.
200. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2368 (2018).
201. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
202. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (“[T]he
Court must exercise extreme caution before suggesting that the First
Amendment provides scant protection for access to vast networks in that
medium.”).
203. Id. at 1732.
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6. Under ESICA, the major social media platforms would be able
to easily and plainly disassociate from users’ disagreeable speech
In PruneYard and FAIR, the Court identified a host’s capacity
to publicly disavow an accommodated speaker’s opinion as a crucial
factor in compelled speech analysis.204 Under ESICA, the major
social media platforms would remain free to publish disclaimers
distinguishing their stances from those of users with whom they
disagree. Seemingly, the bill would even allow platforms to engage
with posts (e.g., by labelling them misleading, untruthful, or
otherwise problematic)—so long as such engagement is neutrally
applied to content across the political spectrum and not designed to
negatively impact a particular party, candidate, or viewpoint.
Simply put, ESICA would not force the major social media
platforms to adopt content moderation policies giving rise to an
impermissible “implication” of endorsement.205 Absent an
“intimat[e] connect[ion]” between the platforms and the speech of
any given user, there is no appreciable infringement on autonomy
of expression, a fundamental interest guarded in the compelled
speech context.206
CONCLUSION

Free speech—understood as isēgoria and parrhēsia—is the
lifeblood of democracy. This blood now flows through the veins of
social media, which provides every citizen an equal opportunity for
candid, confrontational speech.207 Therefore, the major social
204. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Instit. Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 65 (2006);
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980).
205. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 722 (1977).
206. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S.
557, 576 (1995).
207. The debate over Section 230 continues to evolve at a rapid clip. Several
developments, while outside the scope of this Comment, merit brief mention.
In May 2020, the Trump administration acknowledged the danger of
politically-biased censorship on social media and recommended that Section
230 immunity extend only to those who moderate content in good faith. See
Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34079 (May 28, 2020). In June 2020,
Senators Hawley and Rubio introduced a bill that would “prohibit Big Tech
companies from receiving Section 230 immunity unless they update their
terms of service to operate under a clear good faith standard and pay a $5,000
fine if they violate those terms.” Press Release, Senator Marco Rubio, Rubio,
Hawley Announce Bill Empowering Americans to Hold Big Tech Companies
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media platforms must be dissuaded from engaging in politically
biased content moderation. ESICA offers a creative and arguably
constitutional means of protecting and nourishing America’s robust
free speech tradition on the “vast democratic forums” of the
internet. Ultimately, ESICA should be seen not as compelling
speech, but as securing speech, ensuring the advance of America’s
noisy, noble democratic experiment into cyberspace.

Accountable
for
Acting
in
Bad
Faith
(June
17,
2020),
https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2020/6/rubio-hawleyannounce-bill-empowering-americans-to-hold-big-tech-companiesaccountable-for-acting-in-bad-faith [perma.cc/D42E-AALA]. In August 2020,
the Department of Justice recommended “reform[ing]” and “realign[ing]”
Section 230 so as to safeguard free speech on the major social media platforms.
See Department of Justice’s Review of Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/ag/departmentjustice-s-review-section-230-communications-decency-act1996?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery [https://perma.cc/AX8PUE38] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021). In December 2020, President Trump vetoed
the National Defense Authorization Act because, among other things, it failed
to eliminate Section 230 liability for social media companies. See Sahil Kapur
and Dareh Gregorian, Congress overrides Trump’s veto for the first time on
major
military
bill,
NBC
NEWS
(Jan.
1,
2021),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/congress-overrides-trump-s-vetofirst-time-major-military-bill-n1252652 [https://perma.cc/N82K-DAQX]. On
January 8, 2021, Twitter “permanently suspended” President Trump in the
wake of the Capitol Riot. Brian Fung, Twitter bans President Trump
permanently, CNN BUSINESS (Jan. 9, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/
08/tech/trump-twitter-ban/index.html [perma.cc/5ZKZ-KDND].
Such a
suspension effectively eliminates all of his tweets from public viewing. Twitter
also seems to have undertaken a widespread purge of conservative accounts.
See, e.g., James Woods (@RealJamesWoods), TWITTER (Jan. 8, 2021, 10:57 PM),
https://twitter.com/RealJamesWoods/status/1347754402581340163 [https://
perma.cc/S9FR-8NZY] (a far-right celebrity claiming to have lost 85,000
followers within roughly 36 hours). Such actions bespeak the timeliness of this
Comment and the salience of ESICA and similar legislation. Yet they
simultaneously call into question this Comment’s contention that the
platforms do not exercise editorial discretion or produce coherent speech
products. The question is whether censoring criminal (or borderline criminal)
content—or the users who produce such content—really amounts to editorial
discretion as traditionally understood, and whether such actions render the
platforms coherent speech products. Events will likely continue to outpace this
Comment, but hopefully its core arguments and principles will remain
valuable in judging the wisdom and lawfulness of regulating the major social
media platforms to ensure robust free speech online.

